Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Religious Belief by Sayre, Patricia
  308 
Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Religious Belief 
Patricia Sayre, Notre Dame 
1. Wittgenstein and Religious Belief 
Contemporary philosophers of religion delimiting their field 
often distinguish between belief in and belief that, and then 
focus on the latter as more pertinent to a philosophical 
investigation of religious belief. The believer's relationship 
to a proposition, and the relationship between that propo-
sition and reality is of primary concern. The epistemology 
of religious belief has thus tended to be approached as a 
species of justification theory; its task is to provide a satis-
factory account of our acceptance or rejection of various 
religiously relevant propositions. It is against this back-
ground that some of the more well-known discussions of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion have taken place. 
Hence one much belabored question has been whether 
standards for the justification of religious belief can only be 
determined within the context of the language-game 
played by the community of religious believers; another 
has been whether religious beliefs are even the kind of 
thing open to justification, for it may be that the language 
in which they are framed is expressive rather than proposi-
tional.  
While these are interesting issues, and one can see how 
various strategies and techniques employed by Wittgen-
stein in his later work gave rise to them, they seem curi-
ously bloodless when held up against his terse, intensely 
passionate, writings on matters of religious belief. The 
reason for this, it seems to me, is that when Wittgenstein 
thinks about religious belief, he does so against a very 
different set of background concerns than most philoso-
phers of religion bring to the table. That is, while mainline 
philosophy of religion is almost exclusively focused on 
belief that, Wittgenstein is more concerned with belief in. 
Hence the questions that disturb Wittgenstein have less to 
do with the epistemic status of religious belief than they do 
with the spiritual status of the religious believer, where 
what is crucial is believing in one's own redemption, pas-
sionately embracing a "system of coordinates" so as to 
radically reorient your life. (Wittgenstein 1998, 73e)  
Wittgenstein often seems to write from the perspective 
of one who longs to believe in his redemption, but finds he 
cannot honestly lay claim to the status of a religious be-
liever. The problem is not that his intellect rejects the belief 
that redemption of human persons is possible, for this, he 
writes, is "something that actually takes place in human 
life." (ibid., 32e) The problem is a matter of will, of finding 
within himself the capacity to passionately embrace his 
own redemption. "I cannot kneel to pray," he writes, "be-
cause it's as though my knees were stiff. I am afraid of 
dissolution (of my own dissolution) should I become soft." 
(ibid., 63e) Problems of this sort tend to be dismissed by 
philosophers of religion as beyond the reach of philosophy. 
Important as they may be, they are pastoral, spiritual, or 
psychological difficulties, not epistemological ones.  
Wittgenstein would surely agree with this latter claim. 
Indeed, it could be argued that one of his most significant 
contributions to the epistemology of religious belief is to 
change the subject. He writes: "Religion says: Do this!--
Think like that! but it cannot justify this and it only need try 
to do so to become repugnant; since for every reason it 
gives, there is a cogent counter-reason." (ibid., 34e). But 
even if Wittgenstein rejects the standard justificatory epis-
temological approach to religious belief, it does not follow 
that his concerns regarding religious belief lie outside the 
pale of philosophical concern, especially if we adopt his 
conception of philosophy as a collection of techniques 
designed to help us work our way through confusions that 
prevent us from getting on with our lives. The problem of 
overcoming an inability to believe in one's own redemption 
in the face of a great longing to do so, would certainly 
seem to qualify as a problem in knowing how to 'get on.' 
The following is a modest philosophical effort to dispel a 
few of the confusions surrounding belief in.  
2. Wittgenstein and 'Apocalyptic Atheism' 
Let us begin with the provocative comments with which 
Brian Clack concludes his helpful overview in An Introduc-
tion to Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion. Elaborating 
on points similar to those made above, Clack writes that 
while "the mistake made by philosophers of religion em-
barked on a justificatory project is that of envisaging relig-
ion as something which possesses explanatory power and 
which rests on intellectual foundations...religion is pre-
sented by Wittgenstein as something like a particular 
perspective on the world; a means of assessing life and of 
judging one's actions, a way of living." (Clack 1999, 109) In 
fleshing out his account of this way of living, Clack looks to 
Wittgenstein's 'Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough.' There 
we learn that a religious form of life has "its roots in in-
stinctive human behavior....[and] this primitive behavior is 
definitive of humanity, filling as large a role in the natural 
history of human beings as does eating, drinking, procrea-
tion, playing games, singing, making art, and so on." (ibid., 
123-124) 
But how, if religion is rooted in instinct, can one experi-
ence an incapacity to passionately embrace a religious 
point of view? If we possess primitive instincts of this sort, 
shouldn't it come naturally to us to adopt a religious 
stance? As Clack is quick to point out, primitive instinct is 
only part of the story. Human instincts typically play out 
within the context of human communities, and cultural 
practices can be powerful inhibitors of instinct. If we are to 
understand how belief in could become a genuine problem 
for a person, we need to take into account culture as well 
as primitive instinct. Thus, when reflecting on the "two 
determining features of Wittgenstein's approach to reli-
gious belief: first, the extent to which he was drawn with 
awe toward the religious view of the world; and second, his 
own inability fully to share in that perspective," Clack sug-
gests that it might be "something about the character of 
'this age' which constrained his religious impulses." (ibid., 
126-127) 
To unpack this, Clack turns to Spengler, whose work, 
The Decline of the West, was clearly much on Wittgen-
stein's mind during the years when he was developing the 
ideas characteristic of his later thought. Spengler urges us 
to think of cultures as analogous to organisms. They spring 
forth from the soil of human instinct, are nourished by the 
life conditions of a particular time and place, flower into 
maturity in vibrant artistic, intellectual, and spiritual 
achievements, and then, their possibilities exhausted, wilt 
away. As Clack sees it, the relevant lesson Wittgenstein 
took from Spengler is that "the possibility of religious belief 




is determined by what is allowed and what is disallowed by 
a culture's stage of development." Given our current state 
of cultural decline, Clack concludes, Wittgenstein leaves 
us with "no option but to accept atheism." (ibid., 128) The 
atheism Clack has in mind, however, has very specific 
flavor. It is "not an atheism based on denying the existence 
of super-empirical realities...nor is it the rebellious atheism 
of an Ivan Karamazov, nor yet is it the positivistic atheism 
of denying sense to religious propositions. It is, rather, a 
despairing, apocalyptic atheism that arises from Wittgen-
stein's philosophy of religion, the frustrated and bitter 
recognition that the passionate beauty of the religious life 
is no longer open to us...the possibility of living one's life in 
relationship with God must be surrendered." (ibid., 129) 
As Clack notes, "The conclusions thus reached can only 
be unsettling for believers." (ibid.) This is especially so for 
those of us who have found Wittgenstein's comments on 
religious belief, puzzling and oracular as they might some-
times be, more encouraging than discouraging overall. But 
surprised as we may be to discover that taking those 
comments seriously means that an apocalyptic atheism is 
our only option, the notion that the serious pursuit of reli-
gious belief should end in some form of surrender should 
not surprise us, for the association between a religious 
attitude and an attitude of acquiescence is there from early 
on in Wittgenstein's thought. And so, "as stoic resignation 
has been seen to be definitive of faith, this final renuncia-
tion may itself be regarded as an act of the deepest piety." 
(ibid.) 
3. An Alternative to Apocalyptic Atheism 
As a way of putting together various strands of Wittgen-
stein's reflections on religion, factoring in other thinkers 
known to be influential in shaping those reflections, Clack's 
interpretation is a compelling one. And yet, while Wittgen-
stein is certainly critical of contemporary culture, contrast-
ing its scientific cast unfavorably with the more religious 
cast of pre-modern cultures, his more personal comments 
on religious belief seem less concerned with obstacles 
posed by his culture than with obstacles arising from within 
himself. I suspect that Wittgenstein would reject Clack's 
the appeal to the cultural impossibility of belief in as letting 
him, and us, off too easily. In developing this point I turn to 
another philosopher who was surely as influential on Witt-
genstein's thinking as Spengler, but whom Clack more or 
less relegates to the footnotes. 
Kierkegaard offers an interesting counterpoint to 
Spengler, for he too thought of human history in terms of 
the rise and fall of cultures, each with its own peculiar 
character. And, again like Spengler, he took a dim view of 
the present age, finding its spirit antithetical to the spirit of 
religion. Religion calls each of us, as flesh and blood indi-
viduals, to make a passionate commitment. The spirit of 
our overly intellectualized, reflective age, on the other 
hand, operates in a realm of abstractions, leveling the 
ground of all particularity and difference in its preference 
for bloodless generalities. The resonance here with Witt-
genstein's later philosophy is unmistakable, as is the 
shared pessimism about the likelihood that much can be 
done to relieve the darkness of these times. As Kierke-
gaard sees it, there is nothing any individual or collective 
can do to arrest the abstract process of leveling so char-
acteristic of our age. It is "bound to continue, like a trade 
wind, and consume everything." (Kierkegaard 1962, 55-56)  
All this may seem simply to strengthen the case for there 
being something about our age prohibiting religious belief, 
but Kierkegaard draws a different conclusion. The char-
acter of our age, far from ruling out religious belief, simply 
throws into starker contrast what such belief requires, 
namely, that each one of us, for ourselves and without 
expecting our culture to do the work for us, leap passion-
ately into the arms of God. Here we have a leveling which 
places the same religious requirement before us all, and 
while the abstract leveling of our age can obscure the 
leveling involved in a religious point of view, there is no in 
principle impossibility in the passionately interested indi-
vidual discovering the difference. For Kierkegaard, then, 
although the spirit of our age may bear a different relation 
to the spirit of religious belief than that of other ages, the 
task that faces the individual believer is a task of the same 
infinite difficulty whatever the historical era.  
This, I think, is closer to a view Wittgenstein would en-
dorse than the apocalyptic atheism proposed by Clack. 
Wittgenstein, sounding very much like Kierkegaard, writes 
that "The Christian religion is only for the one who needs 
infinite help, that is only for the one who suffers infinite 
distress. Someone to whom it is given in such distress to 
open his heart instead of contracting it, absorbs the rem-
edy into his heart." (Wittgenstein 1998, 52e) There is 
nothing in this passage to suggest the impossibility of 
belief in the face of a recalcitrant culture. It does however, 
point us once again toward the problem of his own recalci-
trance. The remedy for infinite distress is an open heart, 
and yet, Wittgenstein reflects, "The folds of my heart all the 
time tend to stick together & to open it I should need to 
keep tearing them apart." (ibid., 65e) The implication 
seems to be that this tearing apart is something he either 
cannot or will not undertake. For such a one is there then 
no remedy? 
It is precisely in the face of this difficulty that Clack's 
apocalyptic atheism contains the seeds of an important 
insight. To get at this insight, let us turn once again to 
Kierkegaard, who usefully reminds us that our incapacity to 
will our salvation is precisely why a Socratic teacher whose 
skill lies in reminding us of our latent capacities cannot 
help. We need someone who can alter our capacities: a 
redeemer. We call him that, Kierkegaard writes, "for he 
redeems the learner from the captivity into which he has 
plunged himself, and no captivity is so terrible and so 
impossible to break, as that in which the individual keeps 
himself." (Kierkegaard 1967, 21) Wittgenstein mirrors this 
distinction between teacher and redeemer in his reflections 
on what inclines even him to believe in Christ's resurrec-
tion: "If he did not rise from the dead, then he decomposed 
in the grave like every human being...In that case he is a 
teacher, like any other & can no longer help..." The help 
that is required is the work of radical redemption, a re-
making such that "everything is different and it is 'no won-
der' if you can then do what now you cannot do." (Wittgen-
stein 1998, 39e)  
This help, unfortunately, remains out of reach as long as 
one is determined to evade the need for redemption by 
holding tight instead to the notion that there is something 
within one's heart capable of bringing it about. Wittgenstein 
seems aware of something similar to this in his reflections, 
one Good Friday, on whether he should undertake a reli-
gious fast. He writes: "'I want to do it if it comes from my 
heart and not because I was commanded to.' But this then 
is no obedience!...You don't die in this, after all...But I 
myself!--I confess that I do not want to die off, even though 
I understand that it is higher." (Nordmann 2001, 168) Only 
if one is willing to die to who one is and what one wants, 
including one's desire to bring about one's own redemp-
tion, will one succeed in finally taking hold of that redemp-
tion. This is difficult for us not because our culture inhibits 
our instincts, but rather, because our most primitive instinct 




is to avoid death in all its forms and it is precisely this 
instinct that needs to be radically overcome. In a very 
profound sense, then, Clack is correct that the act of final 
piety can only be a renunciation of the desire to take hold 
of one's redemption. But that is only because that desire 
can do nothing to bring it about, not because it cannot be 
brought about.  
Wittgenstein once wrapped up a series of disparaging 
comments on Paul's Epistles by writing, "I want to ask--& 
may this be no blasphemy--: 'What would Christ perhaps 
have said to Paul?'" He went on, however, to add, "But a 
fair rejoinder to that would be: What business is that of 
yours? Look after making yourself more decent." (Wittgen-
stein 1998, 35e) This is a salutary warning regarding our 
reflections here, for, really, it is none of our business to 
speculate about Wittgenstein's spiritual condition. We have 
plenty to do in looking after ourselves. Even so, it is hard 
not to respond in some fashion to the things others say to 
us, and whatever else one makes of Wittgenstein's 
deathbed injunction to "Tell them I had a wonderful life," it 
is hard to hear it as the expression of a frustrated, bitter, 
renunciation. It sounds, rather, like an amazing note of 
grace. 
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